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2Abstract
Using the term “ecological validity”, in a recent issue of Ecological Psychology, Rogers 
et al. (2005) discussed how the simulator they used could provide data by replicating 
natural road driving behaviors. However, ecological validity, as Egon Brunswik (1956) 
conceived it, refers to the validity of a cue (i.e., perceptual variable) in predicting a 
criterion state of the environment. Like other psychologists in the past, Rogers et al. 
(2005) confused this term with another of Brunswik’s terms: representative design. In 
this comment we clarify the distinction between these concepts and also discuss how 
Gibsonian ideas can strengthen understanding of the correspondence between 
experimental task constraints and behavioral settings outside the laboratory. The main 
implication of this theoretical rationalization is for the development of a measurable 
correspondence between experimental and behavioural contexts, enabling defensible 
generalization to both organisms and environments beyond the bounds of particular 
experiments. 
3Ecological Validity, Representative Design and Correspondence between Experimental 
Task Constraints and Behavioral Settings 
Rogers, Kadar and Costall (2005) recently presented a study of eye movement 
behavior using a commercially available driving simulator. In their paper, after the 
general discussion and conclusion, the authors argued that the findings of their study 
were “informative about gaze patterns in real road driving” (p.34). They justified this 
conclusion with reference to the “ecological validity” of their experimental design. The 
term “ecological validity”, as used by Rogers et al. (2005) has typically been used in 
that way by many empirical studies to designate the external validity of research 
designs. However, was this the way that Egon Brunswik (1952, 1956), originator of the 
term and one of the pioneers of ecological psychology, conceptualised it?  
In this comment we aim to clarify proper use of the term “ecological validity”, 
as conceptualised by Brunswik, since the phrase has often been used incorrectly in the 
psychology literature (see Hammond, 1998). Moreover, we introduce another of 
Brunswik’s terms, representative design, with discussion around this second concept 
providing an important aim of our methodological commentary. Finally, we propose 
how key ideas from James J. Gibson (1979) and Egon Brunswik (1955) can be 
incorporated by psychologists to substantiate a correspondence between experimental 
task constraints and ‘behavioral settings’ (as coined by Barker, 1968; and further 
discussed by Heft, 2001). 
Of course, the question arises whether such a clarification is needed and whether 
such terminological precision is required. In this commentary, we highlight reasons why 
such clarifications, no matter how tardy, are essential for the development of a 
cumulative psychological science.  
4Putting ecological validity in context 
As a psychologist, Egon Brunswik (1952, 1956) adopted a functionalist 
perspective in advocating that psychological processes were adapted to properties of 
specific environments in a Darwinian manner. He developed a theoretical framework 
known as ‘probabilistic functionalism’ and an associated methodological approach 
called ‘representative design’ (see Hammond & Stewart, 2001a). Like James J. Gibson, 
Brunswik purported to investigate functional behavior at the level of organism-
environment relations and he advocated the study of how psychological processes were 
adapted to the ‘natural causal texture’ of stimulation (Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 
2004, p.962) within dynamic, noisy environments. However, in this paper we defend the 
view that a representative design of experiments is a concern beyond the particularities 
of the theory developed by Brunswik. Any psychological theory focused on animal-
environment interactions is intended to generalise from the particular circumstances of 
research investigations to wider ecological constraints under which each individual 
functions outside the laboratory.
Brunswik (1952, 1956) argued that an organism’s behavior is organized with 
reference to achieving a particular goal or objective in an inherently probabilistic (i.e., 
uncertain) world. In line with this standpoint, ecological validity was defined by 
Brunswik as the statistical correlation between the cues (perceptual variables, like the 
size of a cave aperture for example) available to an organism and the distal criterion 
variables of interest (a goal, or a desired state, like knowing if the cave is a safe place to 
rest, perhaps measured in terms of a ratio of unsafe to safe events that occur in that 
cave). To make such judgements an organism needs to pick up perceptual information 
of a diagnostic nature. The ecological validities of cues provide a normative description 
of how diagnostic available indicators are with respect to the criterion (i.e., how 
5effectively the distal criterion variables can be inferred from the cues perceived) 
(Vicente, 2003). To clarify, therefore, ecological validity does not refer to the degree to 
which the conditions of an experiment represent some set of conditions toward which 
the generalization is intended. Ecological validity, more specifically, is the empirical 
relation between a cue (i.e., a perceptual variable) and a distal criterion state in the 
environment (Brunswik, 1956). Due to the relativistic nature of this definition, this 
relationship can be interpreted as low (e.g. r = 0.1) or high (r = -0.9), but not “present or 
absent” in an experimental context. 
 This conceptualisation of the term ‘ecological validity’ was not what Rogers et 
al. (2005) intended in attempting to make their case about the generalization of their 
experimental findings to the ‘real’ performance context of driving a car. Otherwise, they 
would not have suggested in their paper that “no simulator study can ever be regarded 
as valid as an investigation of a real-world experience” (p.36). Indeed, Rogers et al. 
were referring to another of Brunswik’s concepts: “representative design”. Brunswik 
defended the view that cues or perceptual variables should be sampled from an 
organism’s environment so as to be representative of the environmental stimulation to 
which it had adapted and which formed the focus of an experimenter’s generalisation. 
Clearly, such extant terminological confusion is a barrier to the development of a 
cumulative psychological science and an adequate conceptualisation of representative 
design is a major issue for consideration. 
Representative experimental design 
The issue of representative design is superimposed on much psychological 
research. Nowadays most psychologists need to explain what significance their research 
6holds for the society that supports it. For example, to obtain research funding it is often 
important to justify that psychological research can be applied beyond the laboratory.
The phrase representative experimental design refers to the arrangement of 
conditions of an experiment so that they represent the behavioral setting to which the 
results are intended to apply. With reference to the concept of representative design,
Hammond and Stewart (2001b) noted, Brunswik used the term represent here in the 
same sense in which a sample of participants in an experiment might be said to 
represent individuals in some population that was not included in the experiment (e.g., 
sampling participants according to their level of expertise as in Rogers et al.’s (2005) 
study). Thus, Brunswik was arguing that the (statistical) logic of induction should hold 
for environments as well as participants.  
Hammond and Stewart (2001b) emphasized that Brunswik did not mean that all 
experiments must represent the conditions of the ‘natural’ world by means of statistical 
sampling (see Stoffegen, 1993, for a discussion around the vagueness of phrases like 
‘real’, ‘typical’, or ‘natural’ world). Rather, Brunswik argued that the logic of induction 
should be applied in both directions, if the generalization is to be justified. Indeed, he 
often used the expression “double standard” to indicate that psychologists employed the 
logic of induction in one direction only (over participants) but typically claimed 
generalization over environments without justification. This “double standard” has a 
long tradition in psychological science. 
 Hammond (1993) pointed out that Wundt, one of the founders of experimental 
psychology, drew a distinction between the lawful nature of hidden cause-effect 
relations to be discovered by psychologists and the noisy surface circumstances 
purported to obscure such relations and thus confuse both the scientist and the behaving 
organism. According to Hammond, Wundt proposed that the messy surface features of 
7the environment should be eliminated through the use of experiments. Helmholtz 
(Wundt’s contemporary, and a main contributor to psychophysics) went further. He 
argued that “it is just those cases that are not in accordance with reality which are 
particularly instructive for discovering the laws of the processes by which normal 
perception originates” (cited in Hammond, 1993, p. 207). According to Gillis and 
Schneider (1966), the approach of Wundt and Helmholtz was to “strip the phenomenon 
of all its accessory conditions which we can change at will, and measure” ( p.218). 
Contrary to these views, Brunswik argued that to hold all variables constant, except one, 
i.e., to strip phenomena of all those confusing conditions, was to remove research of its 
proper subject matter. According to Brunswik, behaving individuals must cope with the 
multiple, noisy, messy situations, which occur in the environment. Only by representing 
those irregular conditions to a behaving organism can psychologists discover how it 
achieves a patterned relation with its environment despite the uncertainty engendered. 
Crucially the question: “to what set of circumstances do we wish to generalize, or apply, 
our results?” should be asked before the experiment begins, not after it is finished 
(Hammond & Stewart, 2001b). Brunswik’s contribution was to urge psychologists to 
develop a rigorous method for answering this question.
 Lack of representative design may be taken to signify that the processes studied 
in empirical research may have been altered in such a way that the obtained results of a 
specific experiment are not representative of functional behavior in participants’ 
environments. The critical point Brunswik raised was that experimenters should avoid 
oversampling highly improbable perceptual variables in the intended behavioural 
setting, thereby avoiding use of perceptual variables that do not exist in that studied 
environment. Indeed, “Generalizability of results concerning the… variables involved 
must remain limited” (Brunswik, 1956, p.53). Consistent with his theory of probabilistic 
8functionalism, Brunswik argued that the description of a task in testing hypotheses 
should be provided by estimating the ecological validity of cues, the intercorrelation 
among cues, and the overall uncertainty in the task. This is a formal way to quantify the 
correspondence between the experimental task constraints and the represented 
behavioral setting. For instance, cue number, values, and distributions might range from 
0 to infinity, and the ecological validities of cues and their intercorrelations range from
-1 to +1. Any sample of situations in behavioral settings would lie within these 
boundaries. A researcher who uses statistical situation sampling can sample various 
combinations of environmental properties (e.g., various numbers of cues, ecological 
validities, and intercue correlations). This was the method Brunswik used to develop 
task constraints to capture and reproduce environments in a representative manner in 
controlled experiments.  
The conventional highly simplified view of the environment generates a vast 
overgeneralization across conditions; as new conditions are brought under investigation, 
the generalization fails and psychology finds itself constantly starting over. Therefore, 
the issue of ecological validity vs. representative design is much more than just a 
philosophical discussion around the purity of a term. As Dhami et al. (2004) noted, 
terms such as external validity are inferior substitutes for representative design because 
they do not signify the idea of sampling variables from the participant’s environment. 
Similarly, frequent use of the terms ‘ecological validity’ and ‘representative design’ in 
an interchangeable manner confuses concepts of achievement and generalizability, 
besides not contributing to a cumulative psychological science. In order to gain a 
stronger understanding of the concept of correspondence betweenexperimental task 
constraints and represented behavioral settings, at this point it is worth discussing in 
further detail the potential contribution of Gibsonian ideas. 
9Beyond representative design 
Brunswik contributed to the methodology of psychological experiments by 
presenting a formal way to measure their representativeness in relation to the 
environment towards which experimental outcomes were to be applied. This was not a 
trivial contribution and is so challenging that it is not recognised in psychology, and is 
often confused with the theoretical concept of “ecological validity”, as in the paper by 
Rogers et al. (2005). Brunswik’s (1956) definition of representativeness was the first 
attempt to quantify the correspondence between experimental task constraints and 
behavioral settings outside the laboratory (i.e., settings that are not constructions of 
scientists, see Heft, 2001). However, as several Neo-Brunwikians have pointed out 
(e.g., Cooksey, 1996; Dhami et al., 2004), there are several situations in which the 
measurement of representativeness is not possible (for example when the criterion or the 
distribution of perceptual variables in the environment cannot be quantified). Although 
Neo-Brunswikians, have tended to theoretically explain in almost all their experiments 
how empirical task constraints are representative of a certain environment, lack of 
quantification is the rule rather than the exception.  
Neo-Gibsonians are not typically as interested in methodology as a pervasive 
subject in the way that Neo-Brunswikians are, but their traditions and discussions have 
also contributed towards a stronger design of experiments. From a theoretical 
perspective, Brunswik was more conventional than Gibson in his view of environment, 
and this distinction is reflected in his methodology (e.g., random sampling of perceptual 
variables vs. selection and identification of specifying perceptual variables).
The organization of many typical experimental tasks is an abstraction from the 
daily environmental experiences of the individual (Rosen, 1985). Experiments are 
perceived by participants, not as an illusion of reality – as if the experimental task was 
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the environment towards which the experimenter wanted to generalize - but as unique 
environments dedicated to experimentation per se (see for a similar discussion 
Stoffregen, 1993; 1997). Moreover, if an individual has to give informed consent that he 
or she is participating in an experiment, then clearly there is the potential for behaviors 
to be influenced by this prior knowledge and associated expectations (Stoffregen et al., 
2003). Therefore, the experimental environment is actually a stand-alone environment 
in its own right and is not representative of another environment. Thus, what is under 
discussion is to what extent perceptions and actions, and/or behaviors in one context 
(the experiment) corresponds to those in another context (in which psychological 
phenomena are observed).  
Gibson (1979) was very clear when he stated that “It is not true that ‘the 
laboratory can never be like life’. The laboratory must be like life!” (p.3). Even though 
Gibson never wrote about the methodology behind the understanding of the ecology of 
perception, he was among the first psychologists ever to draw attention to this issue 
when, in the 1940s, he criticised psychologists who were testing air force pilots for the 
accuracy of their distance perception by asking them to adjust two rods in a visual 
tunnel.
Therefore, representativeness is not a concept to be considered only from the 
environmental, or participants’ perspective alone. Representativeness should refer 
mainly to functional behaviors, (or performance) as the phenomenon of interest. 
According to Brunswik (1956), the adaptation of an organism to a specific environment 
is termed achievement. Conversely, we can define functional behavior as the process for 
achieving a specific goal. Therefore perception, action, and cognition, are some of the 
psychological phenomena of interest that are emergent when the individual is 
performing in a specific environment. Does this mean that experimenters should 
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establish three instances to sample in order to have a representative experiment? Our 
belief is that Neo-Brunswikians would tend to answer ‘yes’ to this question, whereas 
Neo-Gibsonians would tend to answer ‘no’. The reason for this distinction is that, 
contrary to Brunswik, Gibson’s views about the environment were not conventional. 
For Neo-Brunswikians, interest is not focused on knowing whether the task constraints 
of an experiment will ever appear anywhere other than the laboratory, but rather on 
sampling environmental variables in range and distribution to be “representative of a 
carefully defined set of conditions” (Brunswik, 1956, p.53).
But Gibson (1979) taught us that this issue might be more complex. He 
demonstrated that a serious analysis of perception requires a simultaneous analysis of 
the environment and the perceptual variables it has. An event or an object affords what 
it does because it has certain specific properties. But these properties are not intrinsic to 
an object. On the contrary, they are properties taken with reference to perceiving actors 
who will perceive or use the object. Realising these affordance properties requires that 
an organism regulates its activity according to information concerning both the object 
and the actor. Moreover, many of the affordances the organism uses in its ecology 
require extensive practice and learning to be perceived or to be used. Therefore, 
behaviors, and consequently, generalisability of the experimental task is likely to vary, 
based on participant, task, and environmental constraints (Kugler et al., 1982; Newell, 
1986). This variability, if disregarded, biases the experiment, disguising, or 
transforming the psychological phenomenon of interest. The experimental task as a 
“modified environment” implies a specific adaptation of the participant, or in other 
words, it affords specific actions. Thus, both contexts have different affordances for 
behavior.
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By randomly sampling a situation the researcher may be excluding exactly those 
unique environmental properties (or constraints) that guide an attuned participant (e.g., 
an expert in a certain domain) to a successful performance or achievement (see 
E.Gibson, 1969; Vicente 2000). For example, Oudejans et al. (1997) found, in one 
condition of their study that expert baseball outfielders could only be distinguished from 
non-baseball players when the experimental task of catching allowed them to act on 
ball-flight information, and not just react to the sudden appearance of ball-flight 
information. The perceptual variable was not available for pick-up if the expert player 
was stationary, but it was available if the player acted upon ball-flight information (see 
Kirlik, 1998. for a similar discussion about ‘latent constraints’). 
In line with this reasoning, the Gibsonian perspective alerts us to the fact that, in 
order to be correspondent with behavioral settings, experimental tasks should be set up 
in such a way that the actor can perceive in order to act, but also can act in order to 
perceive (Gibson, 1979). Gibson (1957) deplored the design of experimental contexts 
that were convenient for investigators, but relatively alien for participants who typically 
use exploratory actions to seek and use perceptual information to guide goal-directed 
behavior. This is because perceptions and actions require that information about 
environmental facts be referential to the energy for behaving with respect to those facts 
(Gibson, 1979) Ignoring this argument may result in behaviors which do not correspond 
to the functional behaviors in the environments towards which the investigator wishes 
to generalise. For example, in a design like that in the paper by Rogers et al. (2005) we 
might observe expert simulator drivers who have never driven on a natural road (like 
children skilled in video games).  
To examine the correspondence between behaviors in an experiment and 
behaviors in the behaviral setting towards which generalization is intended, it is 
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important to consider Stoffregen’s et al. (2003) concept of “action fidelity”. Stoffregen 
and his colleagues discussed this concept when evaluating the fidelity of synthetic 
environments (created by non-physical displays to simulate a particular environment). 
But we believe that this concept can be applied beyond the relationship between 
simulators and the simulated system. This phrase may be used to define the relation 
between performance in both experimental and intended environments. Action fidelity 
exists when behaviors in the intended environment transfers to behavior in an 
experimental context. It is measured in terms of task performance, like time to complete 
the task, variance in performance across trials, trials to criterion, or kinematic and 
kinetic intra- and interpersonal coordination measurements, for example. As initiated by 
Brunswik, generalization becomes possible by virtue of statistical testing, or 
mathematical formalisation, instead of philosophical speculation. Moreover, action 
fidelity does not mandate a concentration on “stimulus fidelity” (i.e., pre-psychological 
relations between ambient energy arrays both of the experiment and intended 
environment for generalization, see Stoffregen et al., 2003). In this regard, there have 
been several reports of successful skill transfer from simulators to simulated systems 
despite departures from “stimulus fidelity” (see Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001; 
Stappers et al., 2003).
Besides confusing ecological validity with representative design, Rogers et al. 
(2005) also did not measure action fidelity. They simply assumed that driving in a 
physical environment would be the same as driving in a non-physical environment. And 
a correspondent performance would be manifested according to the participants’ level 
of expertise (or better stated level of experience). Moreover, in their experiment, driving 
in the simulator included several distinctly specialised features like a “fake brake” (i.e., 
a discrete button operated by the hand instead of a continuous motion pedal operated by 
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the foot), and other particularities, like the experimenter controlling the accelerator, 
impeding the participant in regulating speed. The simulator was also designed to avoid 
“Various subjective factors, such as fear of crashing and injury [that] can also lower the 
ability to perform effectively under such demanding conditions.” (Rogers et al, 2005, p. 
21). Effectively, these were precisely the “demanding conditions” towards which 
Rogers et al. (2005) wanted to generalise. The limited correspondence between their 
experiment and the environment towards which they wanted to make applications has 
implications for the generalizability of research results. It is possible that their results 
may have been biased by the non-representativeness of their experimental design, with 
an unuintended consequence being that  Rogers et al. (2005) may have actually been 
studying something phenomenologically distinct from their intended application 
Conclusions
An ecological approach demands a methodology that allows understanding of 
the organism’s adaptation to the confusing concatenation of events that disguises the 
regularities of its interactions with the world. In this regard, Brunswik went so far as 
saying that “proper sampling of situations and problems may in the end be more 
important than proper sampling of subjects, considering the fact that individuals are 
probably on the whole much more alike than are situations among one another” 
(Brunswik, 1956, p.39). Regarding the paper by Rogers et al. (2005), we have shown 
how ensuring generality of experimental findings is predicated on representative task 
design and not ecological validity, according to the original insights of Egon Brunswik 
(1952, 1956).
Our analysis had a methodological focus, aiming to provide the basis for a 
stronger representative experimental design, or better stated, to provide a measurable 
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performance correspondence between environments. Based on the idea that 
representativeness should exist mainly in performance, where the phenomena of interest 
can emerge, we drew attention to the merit of Stoffregen’s et al. (2003) concept of 
“action fidelity”. The implication of these arguments extends beyond transfer between 
experiments and intended environment, simulator and simulated; it is also important for 
the design of all kinds of training programs. 
Clearly, a principled approach to designing experimental tasks that corresponds to  
the behaviour setting towards which one intends to generalise should be theoretically 
driven in choosing the affordances of the experiment, as well as in the way participants 
can explore them, but these decisions should be moderated by action fidelity tests.  
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